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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Richard C. Wood, d/b/a

Fernwood Candy &

Ice Cream Company (hereinafter "Wood" or "Fernwoods"), respectfully files this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondents Robert W. Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes, Susan B. Nielson,
d/b/a The Barnes Family Partnership (hereinafter the "Partnership").
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Certain "facts" are set forth in Respondents' Reply
Brief which do not conform to the evidence submitted and heard by
the Trial Court on August 14, 15 and 16, 1984.

Those "facts"

will be discussed seriatum.
1.

In discussing Raymond A. Hintze's ("Hintze") letter

dated September 6, 1979, the Partnership states:

H i n t z e a l s o i n f o r m e d Wood t h a t t h e
p a r k i n g l o t l e a s e had i n c r e a s e d t o
$200.00 per month and, mistakenly, t h a t
Wood's share of the lease payment on the
parking l o t would t h e r e a f t e r be $100.00,
for a t o t a l r e n t a l payment of $1,060.00
p e r month.
Wood knew t h a t t h e Lease
obligated Wood t o pay 75% of the parking
l o t l e a s e or $150 and t h a t i t looked
l i k e Hintze had made an e r r o r , but did
not inform Hintze of the e r r o r [R. 516]
. The i n d e x u s e d by H i n t z e t o
determine e s c a l a t i o n s in the r e n t based
upon i n c r e a s e s in the cost of l i y i n g was
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers ("CPI-U"), p r e p a r e d by t h e
B u r e a u of Labor S t a t i s t i c s , U n i t e d
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S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of L a b o r .
Ex. 2 1 ] .

[R.

508;

[ R e s p o n d e n t s ' Reply B r i e f , p p . 4 and 5 ] .
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ,

the

following

testimony

was

had:
Q:
(By Mr. Hansen) When you r e c e i v e d
t h e l e t t e r on S e p t e m b e r 6, 1 9 7 9 , Mr.
Wood, d i d y o u r e a l i z e t h a t Raymond
H i n t z e had made w h a t i s c a l l e d a
m i s t a k e i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e r e n t a l
amount due and owing on t h e p a r k i n g
lot?
A:

(By Mr. Wood) No, I d i d n o t .

[R. 5 1 8 ] .
Moreover, at no time did Hintze testify as to the
source of the calculations set forth in his September 6, 1979
letter.

The determination of the index used by Hintze was made

by the Partnership's expert witness, Mark Papanikolas, by reviewing the CPI-U Index.

[R. 508].

Indeed, the September 6, 1979

letter does not state that the increases are based upon the CPI-U
Index.

[Ex. 7].
2.

The Partnership states as "fact":

Shortly after the Young letter was sent,
Wood called Hintze and told him the
escalations may force Wood into bankruptcy. [R. 356]. In fact these claims
were false. Wood was not losing "several" thousand dollars a year on the
store and the small losses actually
realized were artificially caused by
the fact Wood substantially markedup the price of ice cream which he
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sold to himself and arbitrarily allocated to the store substantial overhead
expenses incurred by the manufacturing
arm of Wood's business. [R. 575-576,
642, 658, 661].
[Respondents1 Reply Brief, pp. 5 and 6.]
While Hintze testified that Wood had stated that the
"Fernwood Palace location was in financial difficulty, that he
could not afford to pay the rent, that he was going to have to
close it down" and that "1 believe he even mentioned that it may
put him in bankruptcy and that he would no longer be able to
operate there" [R. 356-357], Hintze further testified that he
believed that Wood was referring only to the Fernwood Palace
location.

[R. 385].

Contrary to the Partnership's assertion,

the Palace location was, in fact, losing several thousand dollars
a year.

As of August 31, 1979, the Palace was operating at a net

loss for the year of $1,366.68 [Ex. 24; R. 588].
continued throughout 1979.

This trend

By October 31, 1979, the Palace was

operating at a loss of $3,450.26.

[Ex. 25; R. 592]. As of Dec-

ember 31, 1979, the Palace was operating at a loss of $2,716.84.
[Ex. 26; R. 593, 594]•

The Partnership's claim that Wood "arbi-

trarily" allocated overhead expenses to the Fernwood's Palace is
likewise unsupported by the record.

Payroll taxes were allocated

directly to each store in proportion to the salaries and wages
for each store.

[R. 642].

The remaining administrative and

overhead expenses were allocated to the various Fernwood stores
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based upon the sales at each store.

[R. 642-644].

The Partner-

ship's own expert, Mark Papanikolas, testified that such an
allocation was proper.
3.

[R. 484-486].

The Partnership states as "fact":

On February 14, 1980, under the guise
that Wood had only recently been informed of the expiration of the parking lot
lease, Wood attempted to obtain a
further reduction in the rent by claiming that the expiration of the original
parking lot lease constituted a default
by Mrs. Barnes under the lease agreement. [Exs. 10 & 12, R. 599]. In fact,
Wood knew all about the expiration of
the parking lot lease and the execution
of the new parking lot lease back in the
Fall of 1979 when the rental reduction
to $1,000 a month was being negotiated.
[R. 586-587, 611-613].
Hintze refused
Wood's transparent attempt to renegotiate a better deal. [Exs. 11 & 13].
[Respondents' Reply Brief, pp. 7 and 8.]
Contrary to the Partnership's assertion, Wood testified
that he did not know about the expiration of the original parking
lot lease and the execution of a new parking lot lease until
approximately February of 1980.

[R. 599, 633].
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PARTNERSHIP'S RELIANCE ON AMENDED
FINDING OF FACT NO, 16 AND THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS IS MISPLACED,
Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 provides:
No agreement was requestedl or made
concerning the escalation provisions of
the lease and the $900,00 amount remains
subject to the escalation provisions of
the lease.
This factual determination ignores the evidence presented at trial and applicable case law.

Richard Wood and Gaylen

Young testified that in all communications with Jacqueline Barnes
[R. 616, 617, 618] and Hintze [R. 531, 533, 536, 540, 553, 557,
559] , they stated that Fernwoods desired a fixed rental amount
for the remainder of the lease term.

Thus, unless the Trial

Court completely disregarded the testimony of Richard Wood and
Gaylen Young, there is no support whatsoever for Amended Finding
of Fact No. 16.

However, the Trial Court'& error consists not in

its factual determination, which is not supported by substantial
evidence, but in its application of the laW.
The Partnership does not dispute that the agreement to
modify Paragraph 3 of the Lease was supported by consideration.
It is also undisputed that the Hintze letter of January 23, 1980
does not state that the modification of the Lease to reduce the
rent to $1,000.00 per month was for a period of one year only.
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If the modification was to have been for only one year, Hintze's
letter would have so stated.

It does not.

Furthermore, if the

$1,000.00 per month was to be a "base" rent from which future
escalations under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease
would be calculated, the letter would have provided that the
$1,000.00 per month constituted a "base" rental amount.
Rather than setting forth any of the provisions which
the Partnership argues, and the Trial Court found, must be read
into it, Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter simply states:
. . . I have met with Jackie concerning
the the Palace lease with Fernwoods
and she is willing to reduce the rent to
$1,000.00 per rent [sic] and forego her
claim to the taxes which have accrued.
[Ex. 9; R. 363, 364]. Hintze testified that he did not communicate to either Gaylen Young or Richard Wood that the modification
to the Lease Agreement was to be for only one year.
393].

[R. 392,

Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter modifying the obligation

of Fernwoods to pay rent is unambiguous on its face and can only
be construed as an agreement on the part of Jacqueline Barnes and
the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes to accept the sum of $1,000.00
per month as rent under the Lease for the remainder of the lease
term.
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant Richard C. Wood,
even if one were to find that Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter
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is ambiguous, the law is clear that any ambiguity must be
resolved against the Partnership.
655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982).

See, e.g. , Sears v. Riemersma,
Furthermore, under the doctrine

of practical construction, the undisputed evidence that both the
Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the Partnership accepted for over
two and one-half years, without complaint, the sum of 91,000.00
per month as payment in full of Fernwood's obligation to pay
rent is persuasive evidence that the modification to Paragraph 3
1
of the Lease Agreement was to be for th^ remainder of the lease
term.

Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P,2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975).
The Partnership further argues that any agreement

modifying the Lease by deleting the escalation provision would
have to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and that
no such writing exists.

[Respondents1 Reply Brief, p. 15].

Hintze's January 23, 1980 letters satisfies the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (Repl.

Vol. 3B 1984), provides in pertinent part:
Every contract for the leasing for a
longer period than one year . . . shall
be void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is made in
writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing.
Section 25-5-3 must be read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §
25-5-9 (Repl. Vol. 3B 1984), which provides!:
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Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed
by any party may be subscribed by the
lawful agent of such party.
It is undisputed that in the negotiations with Fernwoods Raymond Hintze was the lawful agent of Jacqueline Barnes
and the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes.

[R. 337, 347, 391, 392].

Accordingly, Raymond Hintze's signature on the letter dated
January 23, 1980 satisifies the provisions of Section 25-5-3
insofar as it constitutes a writing subscribed by the lawful
agent of the party by whom the Lease was made.

Moreover, the

letter dated January 23, 1980 constitutes a sufficient memorandum, when read in conjunction with the Lease Agreement, to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

See Peterson v. Hendricks, 524

P.2d 321 (Utah 1974).
Even were the Court to find that the Hintze letter
dated January 23, 1980 did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds,
Fernwoods' payment of $1,000,00 per month to the Partnership and
its predecessor in interest from February 1, 1980 to October, 1982, without complaint being raised by the Partnership,
constitutes sufficient part performance to avoid the Statute of
Frauds.

The Statute of Frauds has never been construed in a

manner so as to perpetrate a fraud or injustice.

This Court has

recognized that part performance of a contract is an exception to
the Statute of Frauds.

"Part performance which will avoid the
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statute of frauds may consist of any act which puts the party
performing in such a position that nonperformance by the other
would constitute fraud."

In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327,

259 P.2d 595, 601 (1953); Utah Mercur Gold Mining Company v.
Herschel Gold Mining Company, 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1943).
To allow the Partnership to repudiate the modification
of the Lease Agreement after having received, and accepted
without complaint, the sum of $1,000.00 per month for two and
one-half years, would constitute a fraud upon Fernwoods.

Accor-

i

dingly, Fernwoods1 performance of the modification to the Lease
Agreement by paying $1,000.00 per month rent is sufficient to
avoid the Statute of Frauds.
In summary, Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 is not
supported either by the testimony presented at trial or applicable case law.

Moreover, the Statute of Frauds was satisfied by

Hintze's Janaury 23, 1980 letter.

The Trial Court clearly erred

when it held that the modification to Paragraph 3 of the Lease
Agreement was for a period of one year onlv.
POINT II
THE PARTNERSHIP CANNOT RELY ON ITS SELFIMPOSED IGNORANCE TO BAR APPLICATION OF
THE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER AND/OR ESTOPPEL.
The evidence presented at trial was undisputed that for
a period of over two and one-half years th$ Estate of Jacqueline
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Barnes and the Barnes Family Partnership accepted, without
complaint, the sum of $1,000.00 in full payment of Fernwoods1
rental obligation.

[R. 400, 414, 422, 425, 426, 429, 604].

The Trial Court could only find, as a matter of law, that the
Partnership was barred from seeking arrearages in rent under
either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or waiver.

See e.g.,

Josephine and Anthony Corp. v. Horwitz, 58 A.D. 2d 643, 396
N.Y.S. 2d 53 (1977); Perry v. Farmer, 47 Ariz. 185, 54 P.2d 999
(1936); Haun v. Corkland, 55 Tenn. App. 292, 399 S.W.2d 518
(1965).
The Partnership argues that waiver can only occur where
there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The
Partnership states that it had no knowledge of the escalation
clause in the contract, or that the full amount of rent called
for by the Lease was not being paid, until the Summer of 1982.
Therefore, the Partnership reasons, there could be no waiver of
its claim for additional rent allegedly due and owing under
Paragraph 3 of the Lease.

Such an argument is without merit both

as a matter of public policy and as a matter of law.
The Partnership's argument is, in essence, that one may
ignore the provisions of a written agreement and accept payments
under the agreement for two and one-half years, or longer, and
then, when one gets around to reading the agreement, sue for
arrearages. The purpose of the law of contracts is to regulate
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commercial relationships between parties.

If one chooses not to

read a contract, or stand on the provisions thereof, thereby
inducing the other party to act in reliance upon the actions of
the other, the law of contracts is frustrated if the party who
has blissfully closed his eyes to the, agreement may thereafter

1

sue to enforce the terms of the contract that he has, himself,
ignored.

Indeed, the courts have uniformly held that a party is

presumed to know whatever he might, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered.

See, e.g. , Hicks v. City of Los Angeles, 133

C.A. 2d 214, 283 P.2d 1046 (Cal. App. 1955).

This fundamental

precept of contract law was eloquently Stated in Perbal v. Dazor
Manufacturing Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1966) as follows:
He who has at his disposal ihe means
of knowing is held to know; . . . he
who shuts his eyes when to oper^ them and
look is to see is held to see; and . . .
where there is a duty to use diligence,
those facts which diligence will discover are presumed to be known under the
law of notice.
Id. at 686 (quoting State ex rel. Bell v. Yates, 231 Mo.
276, 132 S.W. 672, 676).
In the case at bar the Partnership must be held, as a
matter of law, to have had knowledge of | the provisions of the
Lease Agreement.

The Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the

Partnership cannot sit idly by and accept monthly rental payments
in the sum of $1,000.00 per month and ther^ sue for arrearages in
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rent.

The law imputes knowledge of the provisions of the Lease

Agreement to the Partnership.

Accordingly, by acceptance of the

sum of $1,000.00 per month in full payment of Pernwood's rental
obligation, the Partnership waived any claim for arrearages in
rent.
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Partnership
did not waive increases in rent subsequent to October 12, 1982,
the law is clear that by accepting the sum of $1,000.00 per month
in full satisfaction of the rental obligation prior to October
12, 1982, the Partnership waived any claim for arrearages in rent
prior to that date.

Illustrations 5 and 6 to Comment d of the

Restatement (Second) of Property,

Landlord

and

Tenant, § 12.1

(1977) provide:
5.
L leases a new hotel to T for
ten years at an annual rental of
$50,000.
After entry, T discovers
and informs L that he cannot operate the
hotel profitably without a reduction in
the rent. L agrees to accept $25,000
a year in place of the $50,000 rent
reserved in the lease, and does so for
two years. At this point, T is not in
default, and L cannot recover the
difference between the rent reserved in
the lease and the accepted rent.
6.
Same facts as in Illustration 5,
except that after accepting the reduced
rent for two years, L notifes T that he
must pay the full $50,000 per year
for the remainder of the term.
An
initial inquiry must determine, in the
light of all the circumstances, what the
parties agreed to in regard to the rent
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reduction. If the agreement was that
the rent would be reduced until L
notified T otherwise, or until T could
pay the full rent, and the facts now
establish that he can, T will be liable
in the future for a rental of $50,000
a year. If the agreement was that the
reduction to $25,000 a year was for
the balance of the term, L's repudiation
of the rent reduction is effective for
the future, unless there was consideration for the agreement or it is enforceable under contract law.
Under either Illustration 5 or 6 above, the Partnership
could not recover for alleged arrearage^ in rent which occurred
prior to October of 1982.
In short, where the evidence is undisputed that the
Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the Partnership accepted the sum
of $1,000.00 per month in full payment of Fernwoods1 rental
obligation, the Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, when it
held that the Partnership was not estopped, or had not waived,
any claim for arrearages in rent.

The fact that the Partnership

proceeded in ignorance of the terms of the Lease Agreement avails
the Partnership nothing.

The law, in a case such as that at bar,

will impute knowledge of the terms of the Lease to the Partnership.

The Trial Court committed reversible error in awarding the

Partnership arrearages in rent.

- 13 -

POINT III
THE PARTIES TO THE LEASE DID NOT AGREE
TO USE THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
FOR DETERMINING INCREASES IN RENT,
The Partnership contends that the Trial Court properly
interpreted the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement
by utilizing the United States Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, in
calculating increases in rent for three reasons:
1.

The dispute concerning escalations under Paragraph

3 of the Lease Agreement was resolved by entering into a modification agreement in January, 1980 whereby the amount of the rent
was reduced subject to future escalations.

[Respondents' Reply

Brief, p. 19].
2.

Fernwoods acquiesced in the calculations made by

Hintze based upon the CPI-U Index and had previously paid escalations in the parking lot lease.

[Respondents' Reply Brief, pp.

19-20].
3.

The term "United States Cost of Living Index"

is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence was admissible to interpret
the latent ambiguity in that term.

[Respondents' Reply Brief, p.

20] .
Each of the Partnership's justifications for the Trial
Court's erroneous holding fails under careful analysis.

Hintze's

September 6, 1979 letter does not state that the increases in
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rent were calculated on the basis of the Consumer Price Index.
Rather, the letter states that " [w] e have obtained the cost of
living figures from the United States Government . . . "
7].

[Ex.

It is true that the dispute was settled by the parties

entering into a modified agreement in January of 1980, but not
the modified agreement for which the partnership argues.

The

modification was for a reduction in rent to the sum of $1,000.00
for the remainder of the lease term, wit^h no future escalations.
The Partnership's statement that "Wood cannot now for the first
time object that the wrong index was used by Mrs. Barnes in
calculating the rent increase in 1979" [Respondents' Reply Brief,
p. 19] , is simply a misstatement of the facts.

Throughout the

trial of this action, Wood argued that the Consumer Price Index
could not be used to calculate increases in rent under Paragraph
3 of the Lease Agreement.
In addition, the Partnership's! statement
acquiesced

that "Wood

in the escalation calculations made by Hintze based

upon the CPI-U and actually paid the increased rent calculated
pursuant to that Index from September 1979 through January 1980"
[Respondents' Reply Brief, p. 19], is, oncie again, not supported
by any testimony introduced at trial.
Fernwoods paid the requested

^Fhile it is true that

increase in rent from September,

1979 through January, 1980, there is no evidence in the record
that Fernwoods knew that the Consumer Price Index had been
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utilized

to calculate

increases in rent.

Furthermore, the

Partnership's argument that because Fernwoods had paid increases
in the parking lot rent it somehow acquiesced in the use of the
Consumer Price Index is without merit.

Wood specifically testi-

fed that at no time was he informed that the increases in the
parking lot rent were based upon increases in the Consumer Price
Index.

[R. 521].
Finally, the term "United States Cost of Living Index"

is not ambiguous.

The fact that such an index does not exist

does not render the provision ambiguous.

If Raymond Hintze, in

drafting the Lease Agreement, had intended to utilize "<a United
States cost of living index" he would have done so.

Furthermore,

if Hintze and Jacqueline Barnes had intended to use the CPI-U
Index, the Lease Agreement should have so stated.

It did not.

Rather, the Lease Agreement of September 1, 1976, refers to "the
United States Cost of Living Index" which can only have reference
to a specific index.

That such an index does not exist does not

render the provision ambiguous, but rather renders it unenforceable.

See Seattle-First National Bank v. Earl, 17 Wash. App.

830, 565 P.2d 1215 (1977).
The Partnership argues that the Consumer Price Index,
CPI-U, fairly comports with the intention of the parties as
testified

to by Richard Wood.

The Partnership's assertion is

based upon the following exchange:
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Q:
(By Mr. Burbidge)
And a t t h e time
you s i g n e d t h e l e a s e you a s s u m e d , d i d
you n o t , t h a t t h e r e was a c o s t of l i v i n g
index a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e United S t a t e s ;
d i d n ' t you?
A:

(By Mr. Wood)

I guess so.

Q:
And you d i d n ' t c o n s i d e r t h a t i t
would be some s u b - i n d e x , l i k e a r e g i o n
of t h e United S t a t e s ; d i d you?
A:

No.

Q:
Didn't
you?
A:

even know t h e y e x i s t e d ;

did

I did n o t .

[R. 5 2 2 ] .
What the Partnership's argument ignores is that there
exist at least two other nationwide cost jof living indexes which
could also arguably be applicable, the "Consumer Price Index,
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, GPI-W" [R. 467; Ex. 22],
as well as cost of living figures published by the Department of
Commerce.

[R. 476]. For Richard Wood to testify that he belie-

ved that a nationwide index would be utilized, covering the
i

national as a whole, is not testimony that Richard Wood intended
that the Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, would be utilized.
Hintze did not offer any testimony whatsoever as to why
he utilized the CPI-U in calculating the rent increase set forth
in his September 6, 1979 letter or whether the use of that Index,
in his opinion, fairly comported with the intent of the parties.
During the first day of trial, the only justification that the
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Partnership's expert witness, Mark Papanikolas, testified to for
utilizing the CPI-U Index to determine increases in rent was that
that was the only index which was compiled in one source and it
was easy to use.

[R. 471, 472]. Indeed, Mr. Papanikolas did not

determine until after his first day of testimony that Hintze had
utilized the CPI-U Index in calculating the rent increase
forth in the September 6, 1979 letter.
Citing

set

[R. 507, 508].

Panorama Residential Protective Association v.

Panorama Corporation, 28 Wash App. 923, 627 P.2d 121 (1981), the
Partnership states that " [t]he fact that the Lease did not recite
the precise name of the index and contained the language 'Cost of
Living Index1 instead [of] 'Consumer Price Index' is not determinative."

[Respondents' Reply Brief, p. 21].

A close reading

of Panorama Residential Protective Association, supra, shows that
the use of the Consumer Price Index to calculate increases in
rent was not an issue.
The Trial Court, in awarding damages based upon increases in the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, CPI-U"
Index created obligations not agreed to or intended by the
parties.

The provisions of the Lease Agreement are unambiguous

on their face and, accordingly, the parties are bound by the
provisions therein.

This Court must reverse the Trial Court's

Judgment insofar as it awards arrearages in rent based upon
increases in the Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, provides that rent
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escalations under Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement are to be
determined based upon fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index,
and establishes a current monthly rental amount due on the leased
premises based upon increases in th£ Consumer Price Index.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
PARTNERSHIP JUDGMENT FOR INCREASES
IN PROPERTY TAXES.
Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement provides, in substance, that the Lessee [Fernwoods] was to pay 75% of any increase in property taxes over the 1976 level "upon proof of
I
payment of the same [by the Lessor] . . .r
With respect to the Trial Court's Judgment awarding the
Partnership damages for increases in property taxes, there are
two issues for this Court to decide.

First, does Paragraph 4 of

the Lease Agreement provide that Fernwoods need only pay an
increase in property taxes "upon proof of payment of the same",
thus creating a condition precedent to Fernwood's obligation to
pay an increase in property taxes.

Second, did the Partnership

fulfill this condition precedent prior to trial.

The Partner-

ship's Reply Brief addresses neither of these fundamental issues.
1
It is undisputed that words such las "upon the happening
of such event" or similar language connote an intention for a
condition rather than a promise or covenant.

See, e.g. , Hohen-

berg Brothers Company v. George E. Gibbons & Company, 537 S.W. 2d
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1 (Tex. 1976); Kosberg v. Brownr 601 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).

Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement clearly sets forth a

condition precedent to Fernwoods' obligation to pay increases
in property taxes - that the Partnership first tender to Fernwoods proof of payment by the Partnership of an increase.
In answer to the second issue before the Court, it is
undisputed that the Partnership did not tender, prior to trial,
proof of payment by the Partnership of increases in property
taxes on the leased premises.
Recognizing

[R. 414, 430, 605].

that Paragraph 4 sets forth a condition

precedent to the payment of property taxes by Fernwoods, the
Partnership argues that this Court should construe the condition
precedent as a covenant.

[Respondents' Reply Brief, pp. 23,

24]. To accept the Partnership's invitation would be to impermissibly rewrite or "reform" the Lease.

This Court has repeatedly

held that neither it, nor a trial court, can rewrite unambiguous
contract provisions.

See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690

P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984); Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica,
Inc. , 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982).
The failure of the Partnership to tender proof of
payment of any increases in property taxes to Fernwoods bars the
Partnership's

action

for any

increases

in property taxes.

Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221
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(19 5 8) ;

N.R. Nielsen and Son, Contrac|torsf Inc v. Myrick, Cris-

well, Branney, 527 P.2d 935 (Colo. Apb. 1974).

The Judgment of

the Trial Court must be reversed insofjar as it awards the Partnership damages for increases in property taxes on the leased
premises.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth abbve, this Honorable Court
should reverse the Judgment of the Thirjd Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this ^jm

day of October, 1985.
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